Auctions are considered with a (non-symmetric) independent-private-value model of valuations. It shall be demonstrated that a utility equivalence principle holds for an agent if and only if she has constant absolute risk aversion.
Introduction
Most of the research in Auction Theory focuses on the seller's perspective. The Optimal Auction Theorem (Myerson (1981) ), which characterizes auction mechanisms that maximize the seller's revenue, and the Revenue Equivalence Principle, 1 which provides conditions under which a seller is indifferent between various auctions are well-known examples. When following Myerson's proof of the Revenue Equivalence Principle, it can be seen that it follows from a Utility Equivalence Principle for risk-neutral agents, and that these two principles are equivalent. That is, the seller is indifferent between two auction mechanisms if and only if every potential buyer is indifferent between them. Matthews (1983 Matthews ( , 1987 were the first attempts to compare auction mechanisms from the buyers' point of view, when the buyers were not risk-neutral. Matthews (1987) compared first-and second-price auctions, and showed relationships between the preferences of agents over these two auction mechanisms and monotonicity properties of the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion (
). 2 In particular, Matthews showed that when an agent has constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), she is indifferent between first-and second-price auctions. This theorem was generalized by Monderer and Tennenholtz (2000) to all k-price auctions. In this discussion we prove a general utility equivalence principle, that holds for agents with constant absolute risk aversion. Furthermore, we show that this equivalence principle holds if and only if the agents have CARA.
We shall consider a seller that wishes to sell a single 3 item by an auction mechanism to one of n potential buyers. We assume the (non-symmetric) independent-private-value model of valuations. 4 Each potential buyer i is characterized by her utility for money function u i , and by her valuation structure (distribution of types). The set of possible types of i is an interval [α i , β i ]. However, we assume the most general structure of distribution functions, and in particular our model treats atoms as well as atomless distributions. The auction mechanism is typically described by sets of messages, one set for each agent, and by functions (of vector of messages) that define the probability of winning the object by each agent, and the payment functions for each agent.
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The auction mechanism together with the valuation structure define a Bayesian game -the auction game.
For a fixed equilibrium profile in this game, let Q i (t), t ∈ [α i , β i ] be the probability that agent i wins the object in equilibrium given that her valuation is t, and let U i (t) be the expected utility of this agent in equilibrium. Myerson (1981) showed that for a risk-neutral buyer: For all auction games A and B and equilibrium profiles in those games, such that
We refer to this result as Myerson's utility equivalence theorem, 6 and we show that:
• Myerson's utility equivalence theorem holds only for risk-neutral buyers.
We provide a weaker version of utility equivalence. When a buyer is not necessarily risk-neutral his expected utility function, U i , is naturally written as the sum of his expected win and loss utility functions,
We say that this buyer (or rather his utility function U i ) satisfies the weak utility equivalence condition if: There exists a positive function h such that for all auction games A and B and equilibrium profiles in those games, for which Q
We prove that :
5 There are two such payment functions for each agent. One function describes the payment paid by her, when she wins the item, and the other one gives her payment when she does not win. This splitting of payments is necessary when dealing with agents that are not risk-neutral. 6 Note that Myerson's theorem implies that for every two auction games A and B such that
• The weak utility equivalence condition holds for an agent if and only if this agent has CARA.
An important consequence of the weak utility equivalence condition is:
Our theorem is particularly useful in dealing with symmetric and increasing equilibrium strategies in standard auctions (i.e., auctions in which the highest bid wins and losers pay nothing). A CARA agent in such auctions gets the same expected utility from all auctions that give him the same expected utility at his lowest possible valuation. Matthews (1983) and Milgrom (2004) provide utility equivalence principles for CARA agents. However, Matthews (1983) analysis is limited to the case where the two auctions yield the same expected difference, U 
Preliminaries
This section presents the basic notations and assumptions that will be used to describe the auction environment throughout this discussion. This environment includes a single owner (a seller), who wishes to sell an item to one of n ≥ 1 agents (potential buyers) through an auction mechanism.
The agents description
The set of agents is denoted by N. We assume N = {1, 2, ..., n}, n ≥ 1. Every agent i has a von NeumannMorgenstern utility function for money, u i (x), −∞ < x < ∞, such that
• u i is twice differentiable.
• (u i ) (x) > 0 for every x ∈ R where R denotes the set of real numbers.
In addition, (u i ) (0) = 1.
Whenever possible, we will omit the agent subscript. In this paper we will mainly deal with agents who have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). We refer to such an agent as a CARA agent. The set of all utility functions of the CARA agents is denoted by CARA. Recall that an agent has CARA if and only if there exists a constant λ such that
= λ for all x. Note that, for such an agent, the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion is constant and it is −λ. If λ = 0 the agent is risk-neutral and the utility function has the form u(x) = x. Otherwise, u(x) = 1 λ (e λx − 1), if λ < 0, the agent is risk-averse and if λ > 0, the agent is risk-seeking. We proceed to discuss the agents' valuations. We use the (non-symmetric) independent-private-value model. In this model, every agent i ∈ N knows her own valuation (type, willingness to pay), t i ∈ T i , where
This valuation is a realization of a random variableZ i which takes values in T i and has a distribution function
The auction mechanism
The auction mechanism comprises sets of messages, one for each agent, as well as rules that determine the winner and the payments. An agent i ∈ N has a message set M i . Let M = × i∈N M i be the set of vectors of messages. We assume that
• M i is a subset of some Euclidean space for every i ∈ N. 8 Note that M i is a metric space with the natural metric of Euclidean spaces. Hence, M i and M have a natural Borel structure. The rest of the auction mechanism is defined by three functions
If the agents send the vector of messages m ∈ M, the seller conducts a lottery to determine the winner. The probability that i is the winner is τ i (m). The seller may keep the item to himself. Hence,
7 That is, F i (t i ) = P rob(z i ≤ t i ). Our model covers both a continuous and a discrete distribution of types. 8 We do not exclude finite sets of messages.
The amount of money that agent i has to pay if she wins the object is denoted by x i (m) and y i (m) is the amount of money that agent i has to pay if she does not win the object.
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We assume that
• τ, x, y are Borel measurable, and x and y are bounded on bounded subsets of M.
Every auction mechanism C = C(N, M, τ, x, y), alongside a valuation structure I = (N, T, F ), defines a Bayesian game, A = A(C, I), which we call an auction game. A strategy 10 of agent i in auction game A is a bounded Borel measurable 
Recall that b is an equilibrium strategy profile if for every agent i,
for every t i ∈ T i and m i ∈ M i . The expected utility function U 
All the results obtained in this paper can be extended to randomized auction mechanism in which the payments x(.) and y(.) are random variables. 10 In this paper we deal with pure strategies. However, a simple application of the revelation principle yields that for a discrete distribution of types ( i.e., when there are potential problems with the existence of equilibrium), our result can be extended to a setting with mixed strategies.
and U
3 The utility equivalence theorem Myerson (1981) proved that a risk-neutral agent is indifferent up to a constant between any two auction mechanisms which have the same probability-ofwinning function, Q.
Definition 1 (Utility Equivalence Condition) We say that the utility equivalence condition holds if for all auction games A and B and equilibrium profiles in those games, such that
Q A i (t) = Q B i (t) for Borel almost every t ∈ T i , U A i (t) − U B i (t) = U A i (α i ) − U B i (α i ), (3.1) for every t ∈ T i .
Theorem (Myerson 1981) Let i be a risk-neutral agent and T
Then the utility equivalence condition holds. In order to prove the utility equivalence, Myerson (1981) proved that for a risk-neutral agent, for every t ∈ [α i , β i ],
We generalize this to CARA agents. Explicitly, we show that the expected utility depends also on the expected utility-when-lose, U 
From the exponential functional form of the utility function for CARA agent, we get u (t) = 1 + λu(t).
Therefore,
Hence,
Differentiating both sides according to t yields:
Multiplying both sides by e −λt and rewriting,
Since U A i (.) is absolutely continuous, it is the integral of its derivative. Therefore,
Definition 2 (Weak Utility Equivalence Condition) We say that the weak utility equivalence condition holds if there exists a positive function h such that for all auction games A and B and equilibrium profiles in those games, for which Q
The following theorem generalizes Myerson utility equivalence theorem to CARA agents: The theorem obtains by subtracting (3.2) written for the two mechanisms A and B, and let h(t) = e λ(α i −t) for every t ∈ T i . One can conclude that h(t) must have the form h(t) = ce λ(α i −t) , for every t ∈ T i , where c > 0.
Theorem 1 helps us to compare the utility from two auction games that satisfy the weak utility equivalence condition. Most of the auction games that have been studied satisfy those conditions. In particular, every symmetric auction game in which the highest bid wins, losers do not pay and the equilibrium bid function is increasing, has the same parameters:
and U
A,l i (t) = 0 for every t. Moreover, one can compare two auctions that have the same entry fee (not only constant fee). The following corollary states that if the two symmetric auction games have, in addition, the same expected utility given the lowest type, then the expected utility from both auctions is the same. Therefore, a CARA agent is indifferent among all the k-price auctions with the same entry fee, if there are no atoms on F i . 
Corollary 1 Let i be a
We proceed to prove a converse to Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 Let i be an agent with utility function u and T
i = [α i , β i ].
If the weak utility equivalence condition holds, then i is a CARA agent. In addition, if the utility equivalence condition holds, then i is a risk-neutral agent.
Proof : We will consider auctions in which the set of agents is N = {i}. Let z be a real number. Let k be a positive integer satisfying
Consider the following direct auction mechanisms in which the probability to win and the payments do not depend on the vector of messages. In particular, let A z,k be such a mechanism where From the weak utility equivalence condition we get: and we get u (t − z) = u (α i − z). Hence, if the utility condition holds then i is a risk-neutral agent. A slight modification in the proof of Theorem 2 shows that this theorem holds also for a fixed set of agents.
h(t) (u(t − z) − u(t)) = h(α i
)
